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Abstract
The Stolper-Samuelson theorem predicts that the relative wage of high-
skilled to low-skilled labor will increase in the high-skill abundant U.S. but
decrease in low-skill abundant Mexico after trade liberalization, while it ac-
tually began to rise in both countries in the late 1980s. We present a simple
resolution of this "trade-wage inequality anomaly" in a model of variety trade.
Variety trade increases the variety of intermediate goods used by the nal good.
If the varieties and high-skilled labor are complements, the skill premium rises
in both countries. This linking of imports of new foreign varieties the exten-
sive margin to wage inequality is compatible with evidence. Our numerical
examples illustrate that small amounts of variety trade can produce a signi-
cant increase in relative wage.
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1 Introduction
One of the most well documented empirical facts in recent U.S. economic history is
that, as Fig. 1 shows, the relative wage of high-skilled to low-skilled labor began
to rise in manufacturing industries in the late 1980s, and this fact was observed in
Mexico as well.1 As can be seen, these two countries showed a surprisingly similar
timing of the rise in relative wage in the late 1980s and early 1990s.2 The data
also show that, as in Fig. 2, U.S.-Mexican trade (as a percent of U.S. GDP) was
dramatically increasing during the same period.3 Hence, this increased trade might
have contributed to the recent increase in skill premium in these countries. However,
there are a number of criticisms on this line of thought.
One criticism is based on a "trade-wage inequality anomaly." The standard Heckscher-
Ohlin (H-O) model demonstrates a discrepancy between the model and data. The
Stolper-Samuelson theorem of the H-O model predicts that the relative wage of high-
skilled to low-skilled labor will increase in the high-skill abundant U.S. but decrease in
low-skill abundant Mexico after trade liberalization. The H-O model thus generates a
positive relationship between the trade and wage inequality in the U.S. but generates
a negative relationship in Mexico. On the other hand, as we have seen in Fig. 1 and
2, the data generated a positive relationship between the trade and wage inequality
in both countries in the late 1980s and early 1990s. This is a "trade-wage inequality
anomaly."
A second criticism is based on price movements. The Stolper-Samuelson theorem
predicts the same direction of movement of the relative price of high-skill to low-skill
intensive goods and the relative wage of high-skilled to low-skilled labor since the rise
1Here, we use non-production and production workers as an index for high-skilled and low-skilled
workers in the U.S. and Mexican manufacturing industries (Berman et al. 1994; Robertson 2004).
We calculate the U.S. relative wage during the period 1980-2000 on the basis of the U.S. Annual
Survey of Manufactures (ASM). On the other hand, we calculate the Mexican relative wage on the
basis of the Mexican Monthly Industrial Survey (Encuesta Industrial Mensual, or EIM) by rst
calculating the average monthly wage of non-production relative to production labor. The annual
average is then produced by averaging this monthly relative wage.
2As shown in Fig. 1, the non-production/production wage ratio in Mexico reached a plateau after
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was enacted in 1994. Esquivel and Rodríguez-
López (2003) also show the same movements of Mexican wages. Robertson (2004) argues, using the
Mexican Industrial Census, that the Mexican skill premium declined from 1994 to 1998. We also
note that the U.S. and Mexican relative wages are shown on di¤erent scales in Fig. 1, for here we
want to emphasize the qualitative movements of these series. In Section 4, we will emphasize the
quantitative di¤erence of the same series during the period 1987-1994.
3Here, U.S.-Mexican trade is dened by the sum of U.S. exports to and U.S. imports from Mexico.
The data for trade and GDP are from the International Trade Administration and the Bureau of
Economic Analysis.
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in the relative wage of high skill should be driven by the rise in the relative price
of high-skill intensive good in the high-skill abundant U.S. However, data show that
the relative prices of high-skill intensive goods were declining or constant during the
1980s while the relative wage of high skill was increasing in the U.S. (Lawrence and
Slaughter 1993).
A third criticism is based on the volume of trade. Trade-based explanations have
often been criticized due to the small volume of trade as has been shown in Fig. 2.
Krugman (1995) provides a theoretical argument to explain why the small volume of
trade in the U.S. makes it unlikely that trade can account for the change in wages.4
Thus, mainly due to these criticisms, trade-based explanations for rising wage
inequality have been minor in economic academia.5 Rather, major explanations have
been based on technological change. A sharp decline in equipment prices in the 1980s
led to an increase in the demand for high-skilled workers, who were complements
for this equipment, and a decline in the demand for low-skilled workers, who were
substitutes (Krusell et al. 2000).6 This technology-based explanation is consistent
with the decline in the price of high-tech goods and the increase in the wage inequality
both in the U.S. and in Mexico.
We now propose a simple theoretical framework to illustrate the possibility of an
increase in wage inequality in each of the trading countries as a result of even small
amounts of trade, and this can happen without a rise in the relative price of high-skill
intensive good.
We rst present a simple resolution of the trade-wage inequality anomaly. Our
resolution is based on a straightforward application of the well-known model of variety
trade in intermediate goods due to Ethier (1982).7 Ethiers model demonstrates that
the variety of intermediate goods, which nal goods producers can use, increases
4It should be noted that Krugman (2008) argues that, due to the increase in U.S. trade with poor
countries and the growing fragmentation of production, it is no longer safe to assume that the e¤ect
of trade on wage inequality is very minor, although he admits that it is hard to prove the actual
e¤ect.
5Many papers relate trade to wage inequality in the U.S. and Mexico. For example, Borjas and
Ramey (1994) show how trade volumes can be linked to U.S. inequality, and Harrigan and Balaban
(1999) estimate an econometric general equilibrium model of U.S. wages as a function of prices,
technology, and factor supplies. Hanson and Harrison (1999) and Revenga (1997) link changes in
Mexican inequality to changes in trade policy, and Verhoogen (2008) links quality upgrading for
export to Mexican inequality. See Feenstra and Hanson (2003) for a survey on trade and inequality.
6Berman et al. (1994), Karni and Zilcha (1995), Berman et al. (1998), and Katz and Autor
(1999) also relate technological change to wage/income inequality. Kremer and Maskin (1996) link
technological change or skill-distribution to both wage inequality and segregation by skill, and their
model is extended by McCann and Trokhimtchouk (2010).
7Ethiers (1982) model is an intermediate-good version of Krugmans (1979) variety-trade model.
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in both countries after trade and, therefore, their production increases through the
higher productivity caused by increased number of inputs. Let us emphasize again
that Ethier says something increases in both countries after trade.
Upon application of this logic, we show that the variety trade in di¤erentiated
intermediate goods increases the variety of intermediate goods used by the nal good
in both countries. The increased variety of inputs then can mean the increased variety
of tasks to be handled and thus corresponds to higher demand for high-skilled labor.
Through this variety-skill complementarity, the relative wage of high skill the skill
premium rises in both countries. Thus our model provides a resolution of the trade-
wage inequality anomaly.8 Moreover, our model manages to capture an interesting
di¤erence in U.S. and Mexican wages: the smaller country Mexico shows a much
larger increase in the skill premium than the larger country U.S. does as shown in
Fig. 1.
We next argue that our model, though simple, has the capability of being applied
to real world data, although a denitive answer must wait for more serious empirical
work. In fact, the linking of imports of new foreign varieties the extensive margin
to wage inequality is compatible with available empirical evidence. The correlation
between the growth in the extensive margin and the growth in the relative wage
of high-skilled labor was high, over 0.93, in both U.S. and Mexican manufacturing
industries during the period 1980-2000. The variety-skill complementarity appears
to be a plausible assumption as shown by the facts in regards to U.S. production
organization. The movements of the relative price of high-skill to low-skill intensive
goods and the relative wage of high-skilled to low-skilled labor are also consistent with
the observations in the U.S., so our model does not require the Stolper-Samuelson
price-wage mechanism.
We nally show several numerical examples with plausible parameters to see if
we can obtain a signicant increase in skill premium with relatively small amounts of
trade. In fact, our numerical examples illustrate the possibility that increased U.S.-
Mexican manufacturing variety trade, which is a small fraction of U.S. manufacturing
GDP, is capable of signicantly contributing to the increase in skill premium in both
U.S. and Mexican manufacturing industries from 1987 to 1994. We also show that
trade and technological change are complementary in that they both can contribute
8Dinopoulos et al. (2009) also link variety trade to wage inequality. Their model, however,
modies the standard one-sector variety-trade model by introducing quasi-homothetic preferences
for varieties and non-homothetic technology in the production of each variety, thus relating an
increase in the output of each variety not an increase in the number of variety to an increase in
the relative demand for high-skilled labor by each variety.
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to increased skill premium in both countries.
Of course, other economists have also been successful in resolving the anomaly on
the basis of trade models. One major explanation is based on foreign direct invest-
ment. Feenstra and Hanson (1996) show that foreign direct investment shifts produc-
tion activities from the North to the South an endogenous transfer of technology
and thus increases the Norths outsourcing the low-skill intensive goods to the South,
and these goods are high-skill intensive goods by the South standards.9
A second major explanation is based on the Schumpeterian mechanism. Dinopou-
los and Segerstrom (1999) show that trade increases the relative price of innovation
(the reward for innovation relative to the current level of R&D di¢ culty), thus en-
couraging high-skill intensive R&D investment in each country.10 Acemoglu (2003)
shows that trade "induces" skill-biased technological change in the U.S., and this
improved technology can be transferred to other countries by spillover e¤ects. Thus
these explanations also demonstrate the rise in the relative wage of high-skilled labor
in each of the trading countries.11
Compared to these past studies, without introducing any foreign direct invest-
ment or dynamic Schumpeterian mechanism, this paper is successful in formulating
a simpler trade model in which trade between two countries can cause an increase in
wage inequality in both countries. Moreover, this paper is the rst to quantitatively
show the possibility that trade, even small in volume, signicantly contributes to the
increase in skill premium both in the U.S. and in Mexico.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we formulate a very
simple model of variety trade, and we provide a resolution of the trade-wage inequality
anomaly. Section 3 shows that our model is compatible with available empirical
evidence. In Section 4, we present our numerical examples. Finally, we summarize
main results and mention future research in Section 5.
9Zhu and Treer (2005) also show a mechanism closely related to this mechanism by Feenstra and
Hanson (1996). We note that Feenstra and Hanson (1996) resolve the trade-wage inequality anomaly
observed during the 1980s on the basis of a skill intensity reversal: intermediate goods previously
produced in the North but now produced in the South are relatively high-skill intensive in the
South but relatively low-skill intensive in the North. This assumption, however, poses an empirical
challenge since past research has found little evidence for the so-called "factor intensity reversal"
over the period. We, however, resolve the anomaly without assuming this skill intensity reversal.
10Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (1999) show that a contemporaneous correlation between an index
of the relative price of innovation and an index of the U.S. skill premium was 0.80 during the period
1963-1989.
11Acemoglu (2003) might not be successful in explaining the fact that the U.S. and Mexico showed
the surprisingly similar timing of the rise in skill premium. This is because the rise in skill premium
in Mexico should be driven by the spillover e¤ects in his model but this spillover process usually
takes many years.
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2 The Model
In this section, we rst formulate our model. Second, we explicitly solve the model
and show that variety trade can increase the skill premium in both countries. Finally,
we discuss some economic implications of the derived results.
2.1 Ingredients of the Model
Consider an economy with a nal good sector and an intermediate goods sector.
There are two types of skills: high-skilled and low-skilled labor. Their endowments
are given by H and L, respectively. These skills di¤er in that the high-skilled labor
can do both high-skill and low-skill tasks while the low-skilled labor can do only a
low-skill task. As will be shown later, this excludes the possibility that the relative
wage of high-skilled to low-skilled labor is less than one in equilibrium.
The production side is as follows. The nal good sector is perfectly competitive
and non-traded. It uses a continuum [0; n] of di¤erentiated intermediate goods and
the high skill. The technology is given by the following constant returns to scale
production function:
y =
"Z n
0
x (j) dj
=
+H
#1=
;
where y is the output of nal good, x (j) and H are the demand for di¤erentiated
intermediate good j and high skill, and 0 <  < 1. In our model, handling a variety
of inputs is represented as handling a variety of tasks and thus corresponds to a high-
skill task.12 We thus assume that  < 0, that is, the elasticity of substitution between
the varieties and high skill is given by  = 1= (1  ) < 1. We dene this case  < 0
( < 1) as the case where the varieties and the high skill are complements.13
On the other hand, the di¤erentiated intermediate goods sector is monopolistically
competitive. Firms are symmetric and follow Cournot pricing rules.14 There is also
12In some papers, the number of inputs plays a role in a related way. Blanchard and Kremer (1997)
dene the index of complexity which relates the increased number of inputs to more complexity
in production processes. Kremer (1993) shows that higher skill workers will use more complex
technologies that incorporate more tasks.
13We note that we can generalize the production function of the nal good by assuming that
the nal good uses three factors: varieties, high-skilled labor, and low-skilled labor. The results,
however, are unchanged as long as we assume that the varieties are more complementary to the
high-skilled labor than to the low-skilled labor. We also note that, as will be noted in footnote 15,
switching the role of high-skilled and low-skilled labor but assuming  > 0 (the varieties and the low
skill are substitutes) gives the same results in this model.
14In this model with a continuum [0; n] of di¤erentiated intermediate goods, Bertrand pricing rules
give the same results as the Cournot pricing rules do.
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free entry and exit. The intermediate goods can be traded. Each variety does not
require handling a variety of inputs and thus can use the low-skill. The technology of
each variety is given by the following increasing returns to scale production function:
x (j) =

1
b

max [l (j)  f; 0] ;8j;
where l (j) is the demand for low skill to produce each variety j, f is the xed cost
in terms of low skill, and b is the unit low-skill requirement. We note that the high
skill can also do this low-skill task.
The demand side is as follows. For simplicity, we focus on a representative con-
sumer who has the endowments of high skill and low skill: H and L. He or she
consumes the nal good. His or her utility function is given by:
u(c) = c;
where c is the quantity of the nal good he or she consumes. His or her budget
constraint is given by:
pyc = wHH
S + wLL
S;
where py is the price of the nal good, wH is the wage for the high skill, and wL is
the wage for the low skill. HS is the supply of high skill for the nal sector, and LS
is the supply of low skill for the intermediate sector, which can include the high skill.
We assume 0  HS  H, L  LS  L+ H, and HS + LS = H + L.
The feasibility conditions for high-skilled labor and low-skilled labor are:
H = HS;Z n
0
l (j) dj = LS:
2.2 Explicit Solutions and the Autarky Equilibrium
We explicitly solve our model. First, we derive the solutions in the intermediate goods
sector.
Given an arbitrary n, each producer of a variety facing the indirect demand by
the nal good sector maximizes the prot p (j)x (j)  wLbx (j)  wLf where p (j) is
the price of intermediate good j. By using the symmetry x (j) = x, each varietys
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output x and price p corresponding to this n can be given by:
x =
"
wLb
pyn(=) 1
=(1 )
  n=
# 1=
H;8j;
p =
wLb

;8j:
Since the price does not depend on the number of varieties n, the price when
the prot of each variety becomes zero by the free entry and exit is also given by
p = wLb=, and the zero prot condition px   bx   f = 0 gives the output x of
each variety. The equality of labor demand and supply in intermediate goods sector,
n (bx+ f) = LS, gives the number of varieties n. Thus the price p and output x of
each variety and the number of varieties n are given by:
p =
wLb

;8j;
x =
f
b (1  ) ;8j;
n =
LS (1  )
f
:
We next derive the solutions in the nal good sector.
In our model with the CES production function, it is not di¢ cult to obtain an
explicit solution for the demand for each variety by the nal good sector, but we
solve the maximization problem for the nal good sector by means of the following
short-cut method. Dene a new good
X =
Z n
0
x (j) dj
1=
and its price pX , and we can show desired results more easily.
The prot of the nal good sector now becomes:
py (X
 +H)1=   pXX   wHH:
First, by solving the cost minimization problem for the good X, we nd that the
price of X is:
pX =
Z n
0
p (j)=( 1) dj
( 1)=
:
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By symmetry p (j) = p, this becomes:
pX = n
( 1)=p;
where p = wLb=.
Dividing both sides by wL gives:
pX
wL
= n( 1)=
b

: (1)
Second, we solve for X. Since the technology of the nal good shows the constant
returns to scale with X and H, we have the following equality:
y =
pXX + wHH
py
:
On the other hand, the demand for the nal good is given by:
c =
wHH
S + wLL
S
py
:
The nal good market clearing y = c and the feasible condition for the high skill
H = HS then give:
X =
wLL
S
pX
: (2)
Third, we solve for the relative wage of high-skilled to low-skilled labor wH=wL.
The rst order conditions with respect to X and H for the nal sector give:
X
H
 1
=
pX
wH
:
By using (2) and H = HS, in autarky equilibrium the relative wage of high-skilled
labor wH=wL is given by:
wH
wL
=

pX
wL

LS
HS
1 
: (3)
This autarky equilibrium is represented in Fig. 3-a and 3-b. The demand for high
skill and low skill by the production side, H and L, is represented by the isoquant
curve of the nal good: y = [ (wLL=pX)
 +H]
1= which is given by y = (X +H)1=
and (2). On the other hand, the supply of labor for each sector, HS and LS, is
represented by AB. The autarky equilibrium is then achieved at A in Fig. 3-a or C
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in Fig. 3-b, and thus the relative wage of high skill wH=wL, given by the slope of the
isoquant curve, is greater than or equal to one before trade.
Since the focus of this paper is on the skill premium, in the following main text
we concentrate on the interesting case as shown in Fig. 3-a, in which the relative
wage of high skill given by (3) is greater than one. Thus the high skill and low skill
each do their own task, letting HS = H and LS = L. In Appendix A.1, we briey
analyze the case as shown Fig. 3-b, in which the relative wage of high skill given by
(3) is one and the high skill is doing both high-skill and low-skill tasks.
2.3 Trade Equilibrium and a Resolution of the Trade-Wage
Inequality Anomaly
Consider two countries: country 1 and country 2. They have identical technologies
and preferences. They can be di¤erent in their endowments of high-skilled and low-
skilled labor. We assume that the relative wage of high-skilled to low-skilled labor
is greater than one in both countries before trade as shown in Fig. 3-a. Thus the
high skill and low skill each do their own task, letting HSi = Hi and L
S
i = Li in each
country i, i = 1; 2. The number of varieties is thus given by ni = Li(1  )=f in each
country i before trade.
Let these two countries trade with each other. Then, from the derived solutions in
the intermediate goods, we easily get the following information. The supply of labor
for the intermediate goods sector, which is given by LSi = Li before trade, cannot fall
below this Li after trade. This implies that the number of varieties produced within
each country i, which is given by ni = Li(1 )=f before trade, cannot fall below this
autarky level ni after trade. Thus the total number of varieties which is available to
the nal good sector after trade, n1 + n2, is greater than the autarky level ni in each
country i.
Given this information, we show the following results. Here, let us focus only on
country 1.
First, pX1 now becomes:
pX1 =
Z n1
0
p (j)=( 1) dj +
Z n1+n2
n1
p (j)=( 1) dj
( 1)=
:
By the symmetry p (j) = p1 for j 2 [0; n1] and p (j) = p2 for j 2 [n1; n1 + n2], this
becomes:
pX1 =

n1p
=( 1)
1 + n2p
=( 1)
2
( 1)=
;
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where p1 = wL1b= and p2 = wL2b=.
Dividing both sides by wL1 gives:
pX1
wL1
=
 
n1 + n2

wL2
wL1
=( 1)!( 1)=
b

: (1)
Thus we see that the trading level of pX1=wL1 given by (1) becomes lower than the
autarky level pX1=wL1 = n
( 1)=
1 b= given by (1) since the coe¢ cient of b= becomes
smaller due to n1 + n2 (wL2=wL1)
=( 1) > n1 and (  1) = < 0.
Second, from (2) we see that X1 increases after trade since pX1=wL1 decreases
and LS1 , which is L1 before trade, does not decrease. This implies that the marginal
product of high-skilled labor given by MPH1 = (X1 +H

1)
(1=) 1H 11 increases for
any H1. That is, the demand for high skill by the nal good shifts upward. Since the
supply of high skill for the nal good, which is H1 before trade, does not increase,
this implies that the real wage of high skill wH1=py1 increases.
Finally, from (3) we see that since  < 0 ( < 1), that is, since the vari-
eties and high skill are complements, the relative wage of high skill wH1=wL1
the skill premium increases after trade. This is because (pX1=wL1)
 increases and 
LS1 =H
S
1
1 
, which is
 
L1= H1
1 
before trade, does not decrease.15
Thus it follows that the high skill and low skill each do their own task after trade
as well as before trade. That is, the supply of labor for the nal and intermediate
sectors remains atHS1 = H1 and L
S
1 =
L1, respectively. Hence, the number of varieties
produced within country 1 after trade remains at the autarky level n1 = L1 (1  ) =f .
We note that the above results are also obtained in country 2. Hence, we get the
following results.
The variety trade in intermediate goods causes the total number of varieties avail-
able to the nal good sector to simply increase from ni to n1 + n2, the sum of the
autarky levels, in each country i. This causes pXi=wLi to decline and thus causes Xi
to increase in both countries. Consequently, the demand for high skill shifts upward,
thus increasing the real wage of high skill wHi=pyi in both countries. Moreover, since
the varieties and high skill are complements, the decrease in pXi=wLi also increases
the relative wage of high skill wHi=wLi the skill premium in both countries. Thus
our model has provided a resolution of the trade-wage inequality anomaly.
We can derive more results from the above discussion. First, since the number
of varieties before trade is given by ni = Li(1   )=f in each country i, the ratio
15We note that switching the role of high-skilled and low-skilled labor but assuming  > 0 (the
varieties and the low skill are substitutes) gives the same results in this model.
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of the number of varieties produced within each country before trade is given by
n1=n2 = L1=L2. This implies that the rate of increase in ni is smaller in a country
with the larger size of Li, and, therefore, the rate of decrease in pXi=wLi is also smaller
as can be seen in (1). Hence, the rise in the relative wage of high skill wHi=wLi is
smaller in a country with the larger size of Li as can be seen in (3).16
Second, if  = 0 ( = 1), that is, if the production function of the nal good is
given by the Cobb-Douglas function, from (3) we see that the relative wage of high
skill wHi=wLi is not a¤ected by the decrease in pXi=wLi and therefore does not change
after trade in either country.
2.4 Economic Implications of the Results
Before moving on to Section 3, we need to consider economic implications of some of
the results which have been shown in Section 2.3 on the basis of the explicit solutions
to the model. First, we explain the economic reason why the good X increases after
trade, that is, why the MPH increases after trade.
As we have seen, the activities in the intermediate goods sector never change at
all in each country after trade. Some changes, however, do occur after trade. The
number of varieties used by the nal good sector increases, while the input quantity
of each variety used by the nal good sector decreases in each country since each
variety is shared by two countries.
Can the e¤ect of increase in the number of varieties be canceled by the e¤ect of
decrease in the input quantity of each variety? The answer is no. This is because the
e¤ect of increase in the number of varieties is greater than the e¤ect of decrease in the
input quantity of each variety. This is the crucial e¤ect in the variety-trade models
which Ethier (1982) called the "international returns to scale." That is, the increased
number of inputs translates into higher productivity. Thus the good X increases after
trade, that is, the MPH increases after trade.
We next explain the economic reason why the relative wage of high skill can rise
after trade. Now the nal good market clearings yi = ci in each country i, i = 1,2,
before trade are given by:
yi =
wHi Hi + wLi Li
pyi
:
16In fact, this prediction is compatible with the following observations: the number of production
workers in manufacturing industries was much greater in the U.S. than in Mexico during the period
1980-1994. As shown in Fig. 1, the U.S. skill premium increased by 12.5 percent from 1980 to 1994,
while the Mexican skill premium increased by 48.9 percent.
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Since wHi=pyi =MPHi, this becomes the following:
yi =MPHi  Hi + wLi
pyi
Li:
As we have seen, the marginal product of high skill increases in each country after
trade. For the same reason, the output of nal good also increases in each country
after trade.
Since MPHi =
 
Xi +
Hi
 (1=) 1 H 1i and yi =  Xi + Hi  1=, it can be shown
that the rate of increase inMPHi is greater than the rate of increase in yi since  < 0,
that is, since the varieties and high skill are complements. This relationship and the
nal good market clearing condition yi =MPHi  Hi+wLi=pyi  Li imply that the rate
of increase in MPHi should be greater than the rate of change in wLi=pyi. In other
words, the rate of increase in the real wage of high skill wHi=pyi is greater than the
rate of change in the real wage of low skill wLi=pyi . Thus the relative wage of high
skill wHi=wLi can increase in each country i.
3 Indirect Evidence for Mechanism
In this section, we rst show that the linking of imports of new foreign varieties the
extensive margin to wage inequality is compatible with available empirical evidence.
Second, we claim that variety-skill complementarity appears to be a plausible assump-
tion. We nally show that our model demonstrates price movement consistent with
observed facts.
3.1 Extensive Margin and the Relative Wage of High-Skilled
Labor
Fig. 4-a plots the 1980-2000 data on the growth in what Kehoe and Ruhl (2009)
call the "least traded goods" in U.S. manufacturing imports from Mexico and on the
relative wage of high-skilled to low-skilled labor in U.S. manufacturing industries.
Fig. 4-b, on the other hand, plots the growth in the least traded goods in Mexican
manufacturing imports from the U.S and the relative wage in Mexican manufacturing
industries during the same period.
Kehoe and Ruhl classify the set of goods which accounts for only 10 percent of
trade as the least traded goods. Here, we use the least traded goods for measuring
the extensive margin. The data for the least traded goods growth are the Standard
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International Trade Classication (SITC) (revision 2) 3-digit manufacturing data from
the OECD International Trade by Commodities Statistics (ITCS).17 The source of
data for the U.S. and Mexican relative wages is the same as for Fig. 1.
As can be seen in Fig. 4-a and 4-b, the least traded goods that account for 10
percent of U.S. manufacturing imports from Mexico in 1980 account for 42.5 percent
in 2000, and the least traded goods that account for 10 percent of Mexican manufac-
turing imports from the U.S. in 1980 account for 17.5 percent in 2000, respectively.
This indicates that each country started importing goods that it had not imported
before or had imported only in small quantities. Moreover, these gures reveal that
this growth in the least traded goods was highly correlated with the growth in the
relative wage in each country over 1980-2000. In fact, the correlation between these
two series was high in each country: it was 0.932 and 0.947 in the U.S. and Mex-
ico, respectively. Thus the linking of the extensive margin to the skill premium is
compatible with this evidence in both countries.
It is worth noting that the method by Kehoe and Ruhl (2009) used in this paper
for measuring the extensive margin is di¤erent from methods used in the few previous
studies of the extensive margin. Broda and Weinstein (2006), for example, classify
a good as not traded if the value of trade is zero, and Evenett and Venables (2002)
classify a good as not traded if its yearly value of trade is less than or equal to 50,000
1985 U.S. dollars, regardless of the country to be studied. In Kehoe and Ruhls
denition of a non-traded good, on the other hand, goods with very small but non-
zero amounts of trade can also be considered, and the actual dollar value of the cuto¤
can di¤er across countries.
3.2 Variety-Skill Complementarity
In our model, we have represented the variety of inputs as the variety of tasks which
workers need to handle. Thus it is plausible to assume that the increased variety of
inputs the increased variety of tasks to be handled translates into higher demand
for high-skilled workers. In fact, this variety-skill complementarity appears to be a
plausible assumption as shown by the historical facts in regards to U.S. production
organization emphasized by Mitchell (2005).
During the rst half of the 20th century, the spread of mass production, which is
17See Kehoe and Ruhl (2009) for the detailed procedure used to construct Fig. 4-a and 4-b. We
note that the manufacturing imports in these gures include imports of both nal and intermediate
goods. Fortunately, however, much of the increase in trade has been in intermediate goods (Feenstra
1998).
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characterized by Fords factories, led to the larger size of manufacturing plants. On
the other hand, during the second half of the century, exible machine tools have
allowed plants to operate at a smaller scale. The organization of production has
changed from mass production with a traditional assembly line to smaller customized
batches, thus making the size of plants smaller.18
Workers on the assembly line have a single routine task to perform; however,
workers in each batch are no longer as highly specialized in a single routine task.
Each batch is highly customizable and requires a worker who can handle a wide
variety of tasks depending on the custom features of the batch. The change in the
production organization therefore a¤ected the number of tasks and therefore a¤ected
the importance of skills. As the tasks shifted from a single routine task to a wide
variety of tasks, the required skill shifted from low skill to high skill.
Our assumption of the variety-skill complementarity is thus compatible with these
historical facts in regards to U.S. production organization, although a denitive an-
swer must wait for serious empirical work.19
3.3 Relative Price of High-Skill Intensive Goods
The standard H-O model predicts the same direction of movement of the relative
price of high-skill to low-skill intensive goods and the relative wage of high-skilled to
low-skilled labor since the rise in the relative wage of high skill should be driven by
the rise in the relative price of high-skill intensive good in the high-skill abundant U.S.
However, data show that the relative prices of high-skill intensive goods were declining
or constant during the 1980s while the relative wage of high skill was increasing in
the U.S. (Lawrence and Slaughter 1993).
Our model demonstrates price movement consistent with this observed fact whereas
the H-O model cannot. In Section 2.4, it has been shown that the rate of change in
wLi=pyi should be smaller than the rate of increase inMPHi since  < 0. This implies
that wLi=pyi can rise (but it should rise less than MPHi), and, therefore, the price
of high-skill intensive nal good relative to the low-skill wage, pyi=wLi, can decline.
Here, let us recall that the price of the low-skill intensive variety relative to the low-
skill wage, pi=wLi, is constant at b= before and after trade. Hence, the relative price
of high-skill to low-skill intensive goods, (pyi=wLi)=(pi=wLi), can decline while the rel-
18Milgrom and Roberts (1990) present the empirical facts on a change in the size of U.S. manu-
facturing plants.
19The above historical observation is compatible with the theoretical result obtained by Kremer
(1993) referred to in footnote 12.
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ative wage of high skill rises, letting  < 0. Thus the rise in the relative wage of high
skill can happen without the rise in the relative price of high-skill intensive good.20
4 Numerical Examples
We have shown that trade in particular, variety trade can theoretically cause the
increase in skill premium in two countries and that our model is compatible with
available empirical evidence. This section shows several numerical examples with
plausible parameters to see if relatively small amounts of variety trade can produce
a signicant increase in skill premium without technological change.21
An increase in variety trade is here represented as a tari¤ reduction, for a tari¤
reduction in each country can mean that each country can use more foreign varieties.22
Technological change, on the other hand, is here represented as a decrease in xed cost
f . A decrease in f can cause an increase in the number of varieties, n = L (1  ) =f ,
without an increase in variety trade and thus can cause an increase in the demand
for the high skill.23
4.1 Model with Tari¤s
We introduce tari¤s into our simple model and assume that each country i, i =
us;mex, imposes iceberg tari¤s  i on imports from the other country, that is, the
import quantity of a foreign variety is equal to the sum of the input quantity of the
foreign variety used by the nal good and the iceberg tari¤s. We also introduce the
share parameter , 0 <  < 1, into the production function of the nal good:
yi =
"

Z nus+nmex
0
x (j)i dj
=
+ (1  )Hi
#1=
; i = us;mex:
We note that the denition of an equilibrium with tari¤s and all the derivations
of equations below are shown in Appendix A.2. We also note that our focus is on
20We note that the price of nal good can be constant or increase if  << 0:
21Our model is very simple and thus cannot perform full-scale calibrations capturing many facts.
Here, we just want to show several numerical examples with plausible parameters.
22In Section 2, we have looked at the movement from autarky to trade in order to show our idea
in the simplest way. However, here we begin with a trade equilibrium in order to compare our model
with actual trade data. Thus variety trade can increase due to the increased import volumes of
existing foreign varieties as well as the imports of new foreign varieties.
23We note that in our model "technological change" refers to non-trade-based technological change
which can occur without trade, although it is possible to interpret the increased number of inputs
due to trade as trade-based technological change.
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wHi=wLi > 1, thus HSi = Hi and L
S
i =
Li, i = us;mex.
The relative wages of high skill are now given by:
wHus
wLus
=
1  

 
(1  )
f

b

=( 1) 
Lus + Lmex

(1 + us)
wLmex
wLus
=( 1)!!( 1)= Lus
Hus
1 
;
(4)
wHmex
wLmex
=
1  

 
(1  )
f

b

=( 1) 
Lus

(1 + mex)
wLus
wLmex
=( 1)
+ Lmex
!!( 1)= Lmex
Hmex
1 
:
(5)
The volume of U.S.-Mexican variety trade relative to U.S. GDP is given by:
2
Lus Lmex (1 + us)
=( 1)
Lus (wLus=wLmex) + Lmex (1 + us)
=( 1)= (wHus=wLus)
Hus + Lus; (6)
where wHus=wLus is given by (4).
4.2 Numerical Examples: Variety Trade and the Skill Pre-
mium
We simulate our model, "backcasting" from 1994 to 1987, to see what changes in U.S.
and Mexican skill premium between 1987 and 1994 are predicted by the model.24
We rst give plausible values to some parameters. The value of  = 0:83 (= 1/1.2)
is chosen so that the markup charged by each variety is 1.2. Norrbin (1993) and Basu
(1996) both obtained empirical estimates of 1.05-1.4 for markups for intermediate
goods, indicating that our choice is plausible. We normalize b = 10 and f = 100, the
choice of which leaves our results (percent changes in skill premium) unchanged. We
note that by keeping f constant from 1987 to 1994, we assume that no technological
change occurs. The labor endowments Li and Hi, i = us;mex, are constructed
from the OECD Structural Analysis (STAN), the ASM, and the EIM data. U.S.
endowments are rst chosen from the data. We then calculate Lmex so that the ratio
Lus=Lmex matches with the observed ratio wLus Lus=wLmex Lmex in each year (e¤ective
labor units). This is because, as will be shown later, the balance of trade holds at
24Bergoeing and Kehoe (2003) quantitatively test the "new trade theory" by "backcasting" from
1990 to 1961. Due to data constraint, here we use data from 1987 to 1994. Fortunately, however,
Mexico acceded to the General Agreement on Tari¤s and Trade (GATT) in 1986 and agreed to
a major liberalization of bilateral trade relations with the U.S. in 1987. Though the time-series
movements of the inequality over 1987-1994 are outside the scope of this paper, it is worth noting
that recent studies on the dynamics and persistence of inequality are, for example, Ray (2006) and
Alexopoulos and Cavalcanti (2009).
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wLus=wLmex = 1 in each year under our choice of parameters. We also calculate Hmex
so that the ratio Hmex=Lmex matches with the observed ratio.25
We then perform our simulations with the following method.
Step 1: We choose the value of .
Step 2: We simulate our model to 1994 data. We normalize us;1994 = 0:01 and
then calculate the values of  and mex;1994 so that the U.S. relative wage in
1994 given by (4) matches with the corresponding data, satisfying the balance
of trade in 1994 at wLus=wLmex = 1.
Step 3: We "backcast" to 1987. We calculate the values of tari¤s us;1987 and
mex;1987 so that the change in (6) between 1987 and 1994 is the same as the
observed change in the volume of U.S.-Mexican manufacturing variety trade
relative to U.S. manufacturing GDP, satisfying the balance of trade in 1987 at
wLus=wLmex = 1 as well.
Step 4: We calculate how much the U.S. and Mexican relative wages (4) and (5)
increase from 1987 to 1994.
Table 1-a reports the results of our benchmark numerical example in which  =  1
( = 0:5). Here, the volume of U.S.-Mexican manufacturing variety trade is measured
by multiplying the Grubel-Lloyd index (a measurement of the variety-trade share) and
the volume of U.S.-Mexican total manufacturing trade. The index for a country is a
weighted average over SITC (revision 2) 3-digit manufacturing industries as follows:
1 
P
k jEXk   IMkjP
k (EXk + IMk)
;
where EXk and IMk represent exports and imports of industry k. These data are
obtained from the OECD ITCS and the OECD STAN.26 The data for the U.S. and
Mexican relative wages are extracts from Fig. 1. The parameters in the model are
listed separately: free parameters in (a) and calculated parameters in (b).
As can be seen, the U.S. relative wage in 1994 is the same as the observed data,
1.780, and the volume of U.S.-Mexican manufacturing variety trade relative to U.S.
25U.S. endowments are: Hus;1987 = 6707:6; Lus;1987 = 12242:7; Hus;1994 = 6274:3; Lus;1994 =
11845:3 (in thousands of workers). Mexican endowments are: Hmex;1987 = 94:6; Lmex;1987 =
222:5; Hmex;1994 = 210:0; Lmex;1994 = 481:2; which satisfy: Lus;1987=Lmex;1987 = 55:03;
Lus;1994=Lmex;1994 = 24:61; Hmex;1987=Lmex;1987 = 0:425; Hmex;1994=Lmex;1994 = 0:436:
26We note that the manufacturing variety trade includes variety trade in both nal and interme-
diate goods. Fortunately, however, variety trade between the U.S. and Mexico primarily involves
intermediate goods (Ray 1991).
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manufacturing GDP increases by 158.2 percent as do the corresponding data. As a
result, the U.S. relative wage increases by 6.8 percent from 1987 to 1994 while the
data show a 9.2 percent increase, and the Mexican relative wage increases by 34.2
percent while the data show a 43.6 percent increase.
Thus the results indicate that increased variety trade accounts for 73.8 percent of
the change in U.S. skill premium and accounts for 78.5 percent of the change in Mex-
ican skill premium in the manufacturing industries during the period 1987-1994. We
have here illustrated the possibility that U.S.-Mexican manufacturing variety trade,
which is a small fraction of U.S. manufacturing GDP, can signicantly contribute to
the increase in wage inequality.27
We note, however, that U.S.-Mexican manufacturing variety trade is not small
from the Mexican viewpoint. In fact, U.S.-Mexican manufacturing variety trade as a
fraction of Mexican manufacturing GDP was 50.2 percent in 1987 and 75.5 percent
in 1994 as shown in the table. The table also shows the corresponding results in the
model, but the results are far from the data in terms of the percent change. This is
because much of the uctuations in the trade to GDP ratio in Mexico were caused by
uctuations in GDP and in the real exchange rate. Our model cannot capture these
uctuations.
Table 1-b reports the results of the numerical example in which the reduction
in f technological change occurs together with the tari¤ reduction from 1987 to
1994. The results indicate that if f decreases by 10.6 percent together with the same
tari¤ reduction as in the previous benchmark example, then this can cause U.S. skill
premium to increase by the same as data and can account for 85.4 percent of the
increase in Mexican skill premium.28
Thus the results indicate that trade and technological change are complementary
in that they both can contribute to increased skill premium in both countries.
4.3 Sensitivity Analysis
The results obviously depend on the values of  and . We present some calculations
for a variety of  and .
Table 2 reports the results of the numerical examples in which  = 0:83 remains
unchanged but  =  0:5 ( = 0:66) and  =  1:5 ( = 0:4), respectively. The results
27It should be noted that even if we use data on trade in intermediate goods instead of data on
variety trade, the numerical results would be little changed. This is because evidence suggests that
a considerable amount of trade in intermediate goods is variety trade (Turkcan 2005).
28We note that the 10.6 percent decrease in f is equivalent to the 10.6 percent increase in the
number of rms, n = L (1  ) =f , in each country.
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indicate that a more negative value of  a smaller elasticity of substitution between
the varieties and high skill,  is accompanied by a larger change in skill premium in
both countries.
Table 2 also reports the results of the numerical examples in which  =  1 remains
unchanged but  = 0:7 and  = 0:9, respectively. The results indicate that a change
in the value of  the elasticity of substitution between varieties has larger e¤ects
on skill premium in the smaller country, Mexico.
5 Conclusion and Future Research
The main purpose of this paper has been to provide a simple resolution of the trade-
wage inequality anomaly in a model of variety trade compatible with available em-
pirical evidence.
Section 2 has presented a simple resolution of the anomaly. We have shown that
the variety trade increases the variety of intermediate goods used by the nal good
in both countries; as a result, if the varieties and high skill are complements, the
skill premium rises in both countries after trade. Thus variety trade can stimulate
variety-skill complementarity.
Section 3 has shown that our model is compatible with available empirical evi-
dence. The correlation between the growth in the extensive margin and the growth in
the relative wage of high-skilled labor was high, over 0.93, in both U.S. and Mexican
manufacturing industries during the period 1980-2000. The variety-skill complemen-
tarity appears to be a plausible assumption as shown by the facts in regards to U.S.
production organization, and the rise in the relative wage of high-skilled to low-skilled
labor can happen without the rise in the relative price of high-skill to low-skill inten-
sive goods, which is also consistent with the observed fact in the U.S.
Section 4 has shown that our model can produce a signicant increase in relative
wage with relatively small amounts of trade. In fact, our numerical examples have
illustrated the possibility that increased U.S.-Mexican manufacturing variety trade,
which is a small fraction of U.S. manufacturing GDP, is capable of signicantly con-
tributing to the increase in skill premium in both U.S. and Mexican manufacturing
industries from 1987 to 1994.
It is true that the standard H-O model is incompatible with data which show a
rising wage inequality in each of the trading countries. However, we can now show,
using an elementary model, that trade in particular, variety trade can be a possible
source of the increased wage inequality in each country. We note that the result that
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trade can theoretically increase wage inequality is not necessarily negative, for our
model shows that the real wage of both high skill and low skill can rise despite the
increase in inequality.29
Of course, room for future research still exists. First, this paper has made a the-
oretical contribution in formulating a simple trade model to illustrate the possibility
of an increase in skill premium as a result of variety trade. It, however, has not yet
provided a compelling empirical analysis, although it has shown several numerical
examples. This is because (a) trade in nal goods is ignored in this paper, (b) much
of output is services, which are largely non-traded but ignored in this paper, and (c)
trade is not balanced in data.
Thus, in another paper, we formulate a more general version of our variety-trade
model which can resolve problems (a)-(c) and allow us to perform a full-scale cali-
bration.30 In the model calibrated to the Mexican input-output data for 1987, our
numerical experiments show that the increase in U.S.-Mexican manufacturing variety
trade can account for approximately 12 percent of the actual increase in Mexican skill
premium over 1987-2000. The result indicates that our mechanism is an important
factor contributing to the increase in skill premium in its own right, but it seems to be
quantitatively less important than other mechanisms such as technological change.31
Second, intermediate goods are horizontal in nature in our model, but it would be
interesting to modify the model to consider vertical integration as in Yi (2003). Third,
we can analyze the relationship between competition policies and wage inequality. In
our model, the change in the number of varieties is related to wage inequality. This
implies that government can a¤ect wage inequality by entry policies which adjust
the number of rms. Finally, our model has been applied to the problems of trade
between the U.S. and Mexico, but we can also directly apply it to the problems of
intra-trade among EU nations.
29In fact, the real wage of non-production labor has increased, and, further, the real wage of
production workers have slightly increased since the 1980s.
30See Atolia and Kurokawa (2009).
31Berman et al. (1994) argue, using a regression, that skill-biased technological change can account
for 40 percent of the shift in demand away from low-skilled and toward high-skilled labor in U.S.
manufacturing during the 1980s. Krusell et al. (2000) nd, using a calibrated model, that most
of the wage inequality shift of the last 30 years in the U.S. can be explained by the capital-skill
complementarity hypothesis.
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Appendix
A.1 The Movement of High-Skilled Labor
In Section 2, we have focused on the interesting case in which the relative wage wH=wL
given by (3) is greater than one before trade. Thus the high skill and low skill each
do their own task, letting HS = H and LS = L. In this appendix, we briey analyze
the other case in which the relative wage wH=wL given by (3) is one and the high
skill is doing both high-skill and low-skill tasks before trade.
In the autarky equilibrium as shown in Fig. 3-b, the relative wage wH=wL given
by (3) is one at C, and part of high skill is doing the low-skill task in the intermediate
goods sector. This movement of high skill from A to C maximizes the output of nal
good, that is, the consumers utility.
As we have seen in Section 2.3, the case as shown in Fig. 3-a let us conclude that
the skill premium rises after trade. On the other hand, if it is one before trade as
shown in Fig. 3-b, it can be shown that the relative wage wH=wL rises or remains
after trade, and, in any case, the number of varieties used by the nal good surely
increases.
A.2 Model with Tari¤s
A.2.1 Equilibrium
Denition 1 An equilibrium is prices pyus, pymex, p (j), j 2 [0; nus + nmex], wHus,
wHmex, wLus, wLmex, and quantities cus, cmex, yus, ymex, x (j)us, x (j)mex, x (j), j 2
[0; nus + nmex], Hus, Hmex, l (j), j 2 [0; nus + nmex], HSus, HSmex, LSus, LSmex, and the
number of rms in the intermediate sectors nus, nmex, given iceberg tari¤s us and
mex, such that
1. Final good: Given prices pyi, p (j), and wHi, quantities yi, x (j)i, and Hi solve
(a) U.S.
max pyusyus  
Z nus
0
p (j)x (j)us dj  
Z nus+nmex
nus
p (j) (1 + us)x (j)us dj   wHusHus
s,t,
yus =
"

Z nus+nmex
0
x (j)us dj
=
+ (1  )Hus
#1=
;
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(b) Mexico
max pymexymex 
Z nus
0
p (j) (1 + mex)x (j)mex dj 
Z nus+nmex
nus
p (j)x (j)mex dj wHmexHmex
s,t,
ymex =
"

Z nus+nmex
0
x (j)mex dj
=
+ (1  )Hmex
#1=
;
2. Intermediate goods: Given price wLi, quantity x (j) solves
(a) U.S. j 2 [0; nus]
max p (j)x (j)  wLusbx (j)  wLusf; where x (j) = x (j)us + (1 + mex)x (j)mex ;
(b) Mexican j 2 [nus; nus + nmex]
max p (j)x (j)  wLmexbx (j)  wLmexf; where x (j) = (1 + us)x (j)us + x (j)mex ;
3. Consumer: Given prices pyi, wHi, and wLi, quantities ci, HSi , L
S
i solve
(a) U.S.
max cus s,t, pyuscus = wHusHSus + wLusL
S
us;
(b) Mexico
max cmex s,t, pymexcmex = wHmexHSmex + wLmexL
S
mex;
4. Market clearing:
cus = yus; cmex = ymex;
x (j)us + (1 + mex)x (j)mex = x (j) ; j 2 [0; nus] ;
(1 + us)x (j)us + x (j)mex = x (j) ; j 2 [nus; nus + nmex] ;
Hus = H
S
us; Hmex = H
S
mex;Z nus
0
l (j) dj = LSus; j 2 [0; nus] ;
Z nus+nmex
nus
l (j) dj = LSmex; j 2 [nus; nus + nmex] :
Note : (1 + mex)x (j)mex, j 2 [0; nus], means that the imports of a U.S. variety
by Mexico, and (1 + us)x (j)us, j 2 [nus; nus + nmex], means that the imports of a
Mexican variety by the U.S. We note that the U.S. and Mexican nal good can use
only x (j)us and x (j)mex as input, respectively.
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A.2.2 Solutions
Intermediate Goods
Introducing tari¤s does not change the solutions in the intermediate goods sector.
By the symmetry p (j) = pus for j 2 [0; nus] and p (j) = pmex for j 2 [nus; nus + nmex],
the price and output of each variety and the number of varieties in each country are
now given by:
pus =
wLusb

; j 2 [0; nus] ; pmex = wLmexb

; j 2 [nus; nus + nmex] ;
xus =
f
b (1  ) ; j 2 [0; nus] ; xmex =
f
b (1  ) ; j 2 [nus; nus + nmex] ;
nus =
Lus (1  )
f
; nmex =
Lmex (1  )
f
:
Final Good
The prot of the nal good sector now becomes:
pyi (X

i + (1  )Hi )1=   pXiXi   wHiHi; i = us;mex:
By solving the cost minimization problem for the good X, we can nd that the price
of X in each country is:
pXus =
Z nus
0
p (j)=( 1) dj +
Z nus+nmex
nus
((1 + us) p (j))
=( 1) dj
( 1)=
;
pXmex =
Z nus
0
((1 + mex) p (j))
=( 1) dj +
Z nus+nmex
nus
p (j)=( 1) dj
( 1)=
:
By the symmetry p (j) = pus for j 2 [0; nus] and p (j) = pmex for j 2 [nus; nus + nmex],
pXus =

nusp
=( 1)
us + nmex ((1 + us) pmex)
=( 1)
( 1)=
;
pXmex =

nus ((1 + mex) pus)
=( 1) + nmexp=( 1)mex
( 1)=
:
The good X in each country is now given by:
Xus =
wLus Lus
pXus
; Xmex =
wLmex Lmex
pXmex
:
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The relative wage of high-skilled to low-skilled labor in each country is now given by:
wHus
wLus
=
1  


pXus
wLus
 Lus
Hus
1 
;
wHmex
wLmex
=
1  


pXmex
wLmex
 Lmex
Hmex
1 
:
By substituting pXi, ni, and pi, i = us;mex, into the above formula, the equilibrium
relative wages are rewritten as follows:
wHus
wLus
=
1  

 
(1  )
f

b

=( 1) 
Lus + Lmex

(1 + us)
wLmex
wLus
=( 1)!!( 1)= Lus
Hus
1 
;
(4)
wHmex
wLmex
=
1  

 
(1  )
f

b

=( 1) 
Lus

(1 + mex)
wLus
wLmex
=( 1)
+ Lmex
!!( 1)= Lmex
Hmex
1 
:
(5)
A.2.3 Trade
Step 1: Balance of trade.
The balance of trade (U.S. exports = U.S. imports) is given by the following:
nuspus (1 + mex) xus;mex = nmexpmex (1 + us) xmex;us;
where (1 + mex) xus;mex means that the imports of a U.S. variety by Mexico, and
(1 + us) xmex;us means that the imports of a Mexican variety by the U.S.
Step 2: The rst order conditions for each variety by the nal good.
The rst order conditions for each variety by the nal good give:
xmex;us = (1 + us)
1=( 1) xus;us; xus;mex = (1 + mex)
1=( 1) xmex;mex:
Step 3: The ratio of each countrys share in each variety.
From Steps 1 and 2, we obtain the followings:
(1 + us) (1 + us)
1=( 1) xus;us
(1 + mex) xus;mex
=
nuspus
nmexpmex
;
(1 + us) xmex;us
(1 + mex) (1 + mex)
1=( 1) xmex;mex
=
nuspus
nmexpmex
:
Thus, by substituting ni and pi, i = us;mex, into the above formula, the ratio of the
demand for a U.S. variety by the U.S. to the demand for a U.S. variety by Mexico
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becomes:
xus;us= (1 + mex) xus;mex = LuswLus=LmexwLmex (1 + us)
=( 1) :
The ratio of the demand for a Mexican variety by the U.S. to the demand for a
Mexican variety by Mexico also becomes:
(1 + us) xmex;us=xmex;mex = LuswLus (1 + mex)
=( 1) =LmexwLmex:
Step 4: Trade.
The volume of U.S.-Mexican variety trade is represented as the sum of U.S. exports
and imports:
nuspus (1 + mex) xus;mex + nmexpmex (1 + us) xmex;us:
From Step 3, this becomes:
nuspus
LmexwLmex (1 + us)
=( 1)
LuswLus + LmexwLmex (1 + us)
=( 1) xus+nmexpmex
LuswLus (1 + mex)
=( 1)
LuswLus (1 + mex)
=( 1) + LmexwLmex
xmex:
By substituting ni, pi and xi, i = us;mex, into the above formula, the volume of
U.S.-Mexican variety trade is given by:
LuswLus Lmex (1 + us)
=( 1)
Lus (wLus=wLmex) + Lmex (1 + us)
=( 1)+
LmexwLmex Lus (1 + mex)
=( 1)
Lus (1 + mex)
=( 1) + Lmex (wLmex=wLus)
;
where the balance of trade requires the following equality:
LuswLus Lmex (1 + us)
=( 1)
Lus (wLus=wLmex) + Lmex (1 + us)
=( 1) =
LmexwLmex Lus (1 + mex)
=( 1)
Lus (1 + mex)
=( 1) + Lmex (wLmex=wLus)
:
Accordingly, the volume of U.S.-Mexican variety trade is simply given by:
2
LuswLus Lmex (1 + us)
=( 1)
Lus (wLus=wLmex) + Lmex (1 + us)
=( 1) :
Thus the volume of U.S.-Mexican variety trade relative to U.S. GDP is given by:
2
Lus Lmex (1 + us)
=( 1)
Lus (wLus=wLmex) + Lmex (1 + us)
=( 1)= (wHus=wLus)
Hus + Lus: (6)
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Table 1-a Results for benchmark numerical example
1987 1994 Change
Data
Manuf. Variety Trade/U.S. Manuf. GDP 0.018 0.046 158.2%
Manuf. Variety Trade/Mex. Manuf. GDP 0.502 0.755 50.4%
U.S. Skill Premium 1.630 1.780 9.2%
Mex. Skill Premium 2.020 2.900 43.6%
Model
73.0,05.0,18.0,55.0(b)
01.0,100,83.0,1(a)
1987,1987,1994,
1994,
====
===-=
mexusm ex
usf
ttta
tre
Manuf. Variety Trade/U.S. Manuf. GDP 0.015 0.038 158.2%
Manuf. Variety Trade/Mex. Manuf. GDP 0.912 0.924 1.4%
U.S. Skill Premium 1.667 1.780 6.8%
Mex. Skill Premium 1.678 2.252 34.2%
Table 1-b Results for benchmark numerical example with technological
change
1987 1994 Change
Data
Manuf. Variety Trade/U.S. Manuf. GDP 0.018 0.046 158.2%
Manuf. Variety Trade/Mex. Manuf. GDP 0.502 0.755 50.4%
U.S. Skill Premium 1.630 1.780 9.2%
Mex. Skill Premium 2.020 2.900 43.6%
Model
82.111
,73.0,05.0,18.0,55.0(b)
01.0,100,83.0,1(a)
1987
1987,1987,1994,
1994,1994
=
====
===-=
f
f
mexusmex
us
ttta
tre
Manuf. Variety Trade/U.S. Manuf. GDP 0.015 0.038 158.2%
Manuf. Variety Trade/Mex. Manuf. GDP 0.920 0.924 0.4%
U.S. Skill Premium 1.630 1.780 9.2%
Mex. Skill Premium 1.641 2.252 37.2%
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Table 2 Results for numerical examples with di¤erent  and 
1987 1994 Change
Data
Manuf. Variety Trade/U.S. Manuf. GDP 0.018 0.046 158.2%
Manuf. Variety Trade/Mex. Manuf. GDP 0.502 0.755 50.4%
U.S. Skill Premium 1.630 1.780 9.2%
Mex. Skill Premium 2.020 2.900 43.6%
Model
72.0,05.0,18.0,53.0(b)
01.0,100,83.0,5.0(a)
1987,1987,1994,
1994,
====
===-=
mexusme x
usf
ttta
tre
Manuf. Variety Trade/U.S. Manuf. GDP 0.015 0.038 158.2%
Manuf. Variety Trade/Mex. Manuf. GDP 0.864 0.934 8.1%
U.S. Skill Premium 1.694 1.780 5.1%
Mex. Skill Premium 1.935 2.206 14.0%
74.0,05.0,18.0,57.0(b)
01.0,100,83.0,5.1(a)
1987,1987,1994,
1994,
====
===-=
mexusmex
usf
ttta
tre
Manuf. Variety Trade/U.S. Manuf. GDP 0.015 0.038 158.2%
Manuf. Variety Trade/Mex. Manuf. GDP 0.960 0.915 -4.7%
U.S. Skill Premium 1.640 1.780 8.5%
Mex. Skill Premium 1.448 2.299 58.7%
06.2,09.0,22.0,93.0(b)
01.0,100,7.0,1(a)
1987,1987,1994,
1994,
====
===-=
mexusme x
usf
ttta
tre
Manuf. Variety Trade/U.S. Manuf. GDP 0.015 0.039 158.2%
Manuf. Variety Trade/Mex. Manuf. GDP 1.129 0.963 -14.6%
U.S. Skill Premium 1.670 1.780 6.6%
Mex. Skill Premium 0.990 2.179 120.0%
38.0,03.0,14.0,34.0(b)
01.0,100,9.0,1(a)
1987,1987,1994,
1994,
====
===-=
mexusmex
usf
ttta
tre
Manuf. Variety Trade/U.S. Manuf. GDP 0.014 0.037 158.2%
Manuf. Variety Trade/Mex. Manuf. GDP 0.800 0.876 9.5%
U.S. Skill Premium 1.666 1.780 6.9%
Mex. Skill Premium 2.066 2.320 12.3%
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Fig. 1 Relative wage of high-skilled to low-skilled labor in U.S. and
Mexican manufacturing industries, 1980-2000
Fig. 2 U.S.-Mexican trade as percent of U.S. GDP, 1980-2000
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Fig. 3-a Autarky equilibrium with wH=wL > 1
H
L
A
The autarky equilibrium is achieved at A,
and the slope at A is 1>LH ww .
The high skill and low skill each do their
own task.
1>LH ww
y
B
SLL,
SHH ,
Fig. 3-b Autarky equilibrium with wH=wL = 1
L
H
B
The autarky equilibrium is achieved at C
between A and B, and 1=LH ww .
Part of the high skill denoted by xH is
doing the low-skill task.
A
1=LH ww
ySLL,
SHH ,
C
xHH -
xHL+
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Fig. 4-a Least traded goods growth: U.S. manufacturing imports from
Mexico, 1980-2000
Fig. 4-b Least traded goods growth: Mexican manufacturing imports
from U.S., 1980-2000
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